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Abstract
Some economists  have argued that the process  of  continued  and even accelerated.  Since the mid-19th
disintegration  of the world  economy between the two  century,  incomes  of rich countries  tended to converge  in
world wars  led to  income divergence  between  the  peacetime  regardless  of whether their economies were
countries.  This is in keeping with the view that economic  more or less integrated.  This, in  turn, implies that it may
integration  leads to  income convergence.  The paper  not be trade  and capital and labor flows that matter for
shows that the  view that the period  1919-39 was  income convergence  but some other, less easily
associated  with divergence  of incomes among the  rich  observable,  forces like  diffusion of information and
countries is wrong. On the contrary,  income convergence  technology.
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One of the main arguments  in favor of economic integration  is that, in addition to
the  fact  that it  raises  incomes  of all the  participants,  it helps proportionately  more  the
poorer one.  This is the  view that  has informed much of the recent literature  on income
convergence-whether  of the conditional or unconditional  variety. It is a view that  has a
long and distinguished pedigree in economic theory, and is supported by a fair amount of
contemporary  evidence.  In theory,  increased trade raises real incomes of all participants.
But  access  of the poor country to  superior  technology  embodied  in goods  or capital  or
simply through intellectual  exchange, allows greater productivity gains in a poor country
that  is further away from the production possibility frontier.  Free capital  flows will also
help the poor country more, by bringing in new technology and by allowing it to tap into
larger  savings  pool  of  a  rich  country.  Finally,  migration  too  should  contribute  to
convergence  in incomes, as people from poor countries migrate to the rich. Thus, greater
integration  reflected  in  closer  sharing  of  information  and  technology  (knowledge
spillover),  more trade,  greater capital  flows, and labor migration  should  help reduce  the
gap between the poor and the rich.
This view  is behind  a  score  of  empirical  papers  on income  convergence.  The
earliest papers  on the  convergence  among  industrialized  countries  over the period of a
century  beginmng in  lb'10 were by Baumol (1986), and Baumol and Wolff (1988).  The
convergence  literature  continued  with  papers  by  Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin  (1992)  on
convergence  among  OECD countries,  and then  among  European  Community  members
(Ben-David,  1993),  individual  US  states  (Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin,  1992),  European
regions  (e.g.  Cannon and  Duck,  2000,  p.  418),  Spanish provinces  (Goerlich  and Mas,
2001),  and  so  forth.  2  In  all  such  cases,  greater  economic  integration  among  units
(countries  or regions or  states) was  shown to have resulted  in income  convergence-as
we would expect from economic theory.
2 See also the review of findings in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).
2More  recently  somewhat  greater  attention  was  paid to  the  historical  process  of
income divergence (Maddison  1995 and 2001, Pritchett  1997) but that fact did not detract
from  the  mainstream  belief in  strong  causal  link  between  economic  integration  and
income  convergence.  This  is  because  the  "Great  Divergence"  (as  named  by Kenneth
Pomeranz)  was  due  to  the technological  breakthroughs  of the  Industrial  Revolution,
while the divergence in GDPs per capita between the countries over the last 20 years was
explained  away by the fact that the slow-growing (or declining)  countries were precisely
those that did not integrate.  3The only possible shadow was cast by those who regarded
the  "Great  Divergence"  as  not  something  that  occurred-for  whatever  institutional  or
geographical reasons-in one part the world (the "North")  and then (slowly) spread to the
rest, but who held that the growth and industrialization  in the North were  linked with the
decline  and  disindustrialization  in  the  South.  Under  the  latter  hypothesis,  it is  clearly
integration that is the cause of the South's decline and divergence  of incomes.4 The view
is expressed  in Krugman (1991),  and was recently summarized by Baldwin  and Martin
(1999, p.7 ):  At a time before  the Industrial Revolution,  "..regions  are initially identical,
so  the  question  which  region  takes  off is  a matter of happenstance.  Whichever  region
edges ahead initially, call it North finds itself in a virtuous circle. Higher incomes lead to
a larger local market in the North  and this in turn  attracts relatively more investment to
the North. Of course,  the higher  investment rate leads to a growing market-size  gap and
the cycle restarts.. .As the North  experiences  this stylized Industrial revolution,  Southern
industry  rapidly disappears  in the  face of competition  from northern  exports.  In  a self-
generating process, the North specializes in industry and the South in primary goods."
So, at least we see that there is a possibility of economic integration leading to a
decline  in  incomes  in  a  part  of the  world  and/or  to  divergence.  The  introduction  of
increasing retums to scale in the context of neoclassical or endogenous growth model (for
a review see Easterly and Levine 2001) makes this a more realistic possibility. A similar
view  is  forcefully  made  by  Rodriguez  and  Rodrik  (2000)  who,  based  on  numerous
3 For  the most recent manifestation of such a view see World Bank's report on globalization (2002).
4Even if the South's decline (see Bairoch,  1997, vol. 2, pp.  549, 576,  648; also 1989, p.238)  may not be
viewed as the cause of the Northern success.  On a more radical note, Frank (1998) arguers  that the South's
decline helped North's advance  (Frank,  1998).
3empirical  evidence  and reruns of a number  of equations originally estimated by various
authors, argue that economic integration and convergence are orthogonal.
However, this possibility is not very seriously contemplated  by many economists.
The  finding  of income  convergence  among  the  club  of the  rich  countries  (Western
Europe  and its offshoots-to use Maddison's  terminology)  during the  earlier period  of
globalization  1870-1913  provides  empirical  support  for  the  mainstream  view.  5 Then,
following  these  results  and  theoretical  predictions,  the  next period,  1919-1939-the
period of retreat  from globalization-is  to be  characterized  by increasing  income  gaps
between  the  countries.  And  indeed  Lindert  and  Williamson  (2001,  p.13)  write:  "Real
wages  and  living  standards  converged  among  the  currently-industrialized  countries
between  1850 and World War r' and then for the inter-war period, "..there was no period
when divergence between countries was more 'big time'. We do not yet know how much
of this should be attributed  to the great depression, two world wars,  anti-global  policies
and other  forces"  (p.  19).  Lindert  and  Williamson  neatly  summarize  their  results  in  a
table where  the period 1914-1950  is described  as the period of retreat from globalization
which widened (notice the causality) the gaps between nations.
We  have  shown  elsewhere  (Milanovic,  2002)  that  Lindert  and  Williamson's
claim of income convergence  during the globalization phase (1870-1913)  is true only for
a narrow subset of countries (the Western Europe and its offshoots) and not for the world
as  a  whole.  However,  this  finding  does  not  necessarily  invalidate  the  claim  that
globalization did lead to income convergence because one can argue that other countries
were  not really  integrated  in  the world  economy.  Here  however  we  shall  address  the
second  part of their  statement,  namely that  the  process  of de-globalization  during  the
inter-war  period was  accompanied  by (or caused)  income divergence  between  the  rich
countries.  Contrary  to  what  they  argue,  we  shall  show  that  income  convergence
accelerated  in the period between the two wars and did so precisely amongst the select
5See Williamson (1998, Figure  1), Lindert and Williamson (2001), O'Rourke and Williamson (1999).
4club of rich countries that were the main leaders in globalization  before the First World
War, and were the main leaders in deglobalization between the two wars. 6
In the next  section, we review briefly, the relatively well  known facts that show
that  the  period  1918-1939  was  indeed  characterized  by  economic  disintegration.  In
Section 3-the main part of the paper-we show that this period witnessed  fast income
convergence  particularly  among  the "most important" subset  of rich  economies,  and in
Section 4, we discuss what this finding implies for our views on the relationship between
economic integration and income convergence.
2. Disintegration of the world economy  1919-1939:  some facts
There  is little doubt that the inter-war  period was characterized  by disintegration
of the world economy. While the disintegration movement was not entirely clear until the
mid-1920,  as  economies  recovered  from  the  War,  and  would,  even  under  the  best
circumstances,  have taken some time to regain the levels of financial or trade integration
achieved  before  the  outbreak  of the  conflict,  the  trend  is unmistakable  from the mid-
1920's.  There  are  several  simultaneous  developments  which very  clearly  underline the
trend. First, ideologically,  protectionism was in the ascendant in Western Europe  and the
US.  Its  extreme  form was  achieved,  of course,  in autarkic  systems  set in place,  first  in
the  Soviet  Russia,  then  in  Italy,  Germany,  Spain,  and  gradually  throughout  most  of
Europe.  It  is  important  to  stress  that  autarky  was  not  viewed  by  the  new  Fascist
ideologies  as  a reaction to other countries'  unfriendly policies as it was regarded by the
democracies  when they engaged  in competitive  devaluations  and tariff rises or even by
the Soviet planners who faced the enmity of the capitalist powers. Autarky was viewed as
a desirable attribute of a nation-the best economic policy one could pursue. 7
6 Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000, p.  47) is, to my knowledge,  the only paper that shows, using Maddison's
data, that a convergence  among the future European Community countries continued  during the inter-war
period.
7The two German Four-year plans had as their objectives an increase in self-sufficiency  and the
development of synthetic products replacing the raw materials Germany did not produce.
5'Second,  the  responsive-non-ideological  protectionism-was  espoused  by
democracies  during and after the Great Depression.  The famous cobweb  graph of world
trade  (Kindleberger,  1986)  shows  that  the  volume  of world  trade  diminished  for  49
consecutive  months from January  1929 to February  1933-lots of it due to "beggar-thy-
neighbor" policies. As a League of Nations document (1936, p.  186-7) puts it "in order to
trade  with countries  of highly  developed  protectionism,  it  is often  necessary  to  adopt
methods complementary to their systems."
In consequence,  by the  early  1930's,  there  was  little  doubt that  the  world  was
engaged into a period of disintegration,  reflected in all the statistics  (trade, capital flows,
migration),  but  also  driven by  a  changed  ideology  and  by the  experience  of the  Great
Depression.  The. changed  ideological  climate  is well  captured  in  the  words  of Arthur
Lewis (1949, p.  155):
"it was then [after the Depression] that the international system  seemed
finally to break down; that currency controls multiplied; that tariffs
reached enormous proportions and licenses became diminutive; and that
the free multilateral flow of trade was constrained into bilateral channels.
All these obstacles existed in the 1920, as an aftermath of war. But while
in 1920 men regarded them as temporary,  looked forward to their speedy
removal... .in the 1930's the obstacles came to be regarded by a much
larger circle as desirable in themselves, and not just as temporary weapons
for coping with a slump, but as a necessary part of national economic
system."
Let us consider some facts.
Stagnation of trade volumes
Figure  1 shows  world trade  in manufactured  and primary products  (in constant
prices and annual averages)  for the period 1876-1938. After a fast real increase during the
heyday  of globalization  (late  19'h  century  and  up  to  1913),  the  volume  of trade  in
manufactured  products  stagnated  and  then  declined  during  the  Great  Depression.  By
1938,  it was still  8  percent below  the  1913  level.  Trade in primary products, however,
continued  to  rise  throughout  the  inter-war  period  reaching  on  the  eve  of the  Second
6World War a level some  16 percent above the one on the eve of the Great War. Basically,
overall world trade, after rising steadily prior to 1913, stagnated afterwards.8
Figure 1. World trade in manufactured and primary products,  1876-1938
(armual averages, in 1913 prices, $ million)
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Source: League of Nations (1945, p.157).
The  share  of  trade  in  GDP  either  stagnated  or  declined.  For  the  US,  and
especially,  the UK, the decrease  is quite clear.  On the eve of the Great War, trade/GDP
ratio  amounted to 45  percent  for  the UK, and  12 percent  for the US.  The UK numbers
steadily  declined  and by the mid-1930's  were  below  30 percent.  In  the  US, the  share
dropped to 8 percent (see Baldwin and Martin,  1999, p.  15).
Increasing  barriers  to trade
Generally speaking,  barriers to trade increased compared  to the period before the
War.  While  there is some  debate regarding  the extent of protectionism  in the  1920's-
with  Paul  Bairoch  (1993)  holding  that  the  period  saw  a  declining  or  steady  level
8  In nominal terns, trade declined quite significantly as prices of both manufactured and primary products
declined. By 1938, manufactured  unit price was 23 percent below the 1913  level while prices of primary
products declined by more than 40 percent (League of Nations,  1945, p.157).
7protection  and Kindleberger  (1989)  arguing that protection was by  then already higher
than before the Great War-there is no dispute about the 1930's. With the Hawley-Smoot
tariff act  in the US, and then the Great Depression, tariffs increased worldwide.
More  important,  and more  pernicious,  was  the  erection  of numerous  non-tariff
barriers  (NTB),  and  following  them  the  advent  of bilaterism  in  trade  with individual
pairs of countries negotiating tariff rates, doing barter deals  and using special currencies
(the most famous of which was German ASKI mark)  to pay each other for exports  and
imports.  9
Tables 1 and 2 show  different calculations  of average tariff rates (trade-weighted
and unweighted)  in the  1920's  and  1930's as  compared to the pre-War period.  There is
little  doubt  that by the  mid-1930's,  both tariff rates  and  non-tariff  barriers  have  risen
manifold compared  to the situation before the World  War I. "' As the League of Nations
(1936,  p.  188)  eloquently  put it,  "whenever trade  crosses  these  [restricted  trade]  areas,
and even within the area of freer trade, the present tendency seems to be for the new form
of organization [protectionism]  to gain ground,  as if by a species of Gresham's Law."
9  Perusal of the League documents from the 1930's is indeed a melancholy exercise as both the author's
and the reader's patience  is taxed by a monotony enumeration of many restrictions, complicated bilateral
arrangements  and multitudes of exchange rates. The League of Nations continued providing very
mformative  annual economic Surveys until 1944.
'0 While prior to World War I, quantitative restrictions  were negligible, during the 1930's between 50  and
70 percent of world trade was estirated to have been subject to NTB (Crafts,  2000, p.29).
8Table  1. Bariers to trade,  1875-1930's
Tariff  rates  1875  1913  1930s
France  12-15  20  30
Germany  4-6  17  21
Italy  8-10  18  46
Spain  15-20  41  63
United Kingdom  0  0  na
USA  40-50  44  48
Non-tariff  barriers  (% of  all imports)
France  na  0  58
Germany  na  0  100
Italy  na  0  100
United Kingdom  na  0  8
USA  na  0  5
Source: Bairoch (1993), Schoot (1994), Gordon (1941), Kuwahara (1998) as reported  in Crafts (2000, p.
28). Tariff rates are average tariff rates on manufactured  goods.
Table 2. Average unweighted tariff rate,  1913 and 1925
1913  1925  Change
Argentina  26  26  0
Australia  17  25  +8
Austria  18  12  -6
Belgium  6  8  +2
Canada  18  16  -2
Czechoslovakia  18  19  +1
Denmark  9  6  -3
France  18  12  -6
Germany  12  12  0
Hungary  18  23  +5
India  4  14  +10
Italy  17  17  0
Netherlands  3  4  +1
Poland  --  23
Spain  33  44  +11
Sweden  16  13  -3
Switzerland  7  11  +4
Yugoslavia  --  23
UK  --  4  +4
USA  16  29  +13
Source: League of Nations (1927, p.15).
9Moreover,  by the mid-1930's,  the world had broken into  regional  trading blocs.
Germany established its dominance and signed bilateral treaties with a number of South-
East European  countries.  Italy tried to do  the  same within its  fledgling  Empire.  Britain
introduced  the  system  of Imperial  preferences,  and  Japan  created  the  East Asian  Co-
Prosperity zone.  In addition,  the United  States withdrew behind the high protective wall
(in 1931,  the average  tariff on dutiable imports  was 55  percent as  against  38 percent  on
the eve of the World War I)"  and the Soviet Union,  first out of necessity,  and then out of
ideology,  led an explicit  autarkic  policy.  Autarky,  not entertained as a serious idea even
by the early mercantilists,  became  an explicit goal and part of the ideology  of the most
authoritarian  right-wing  and  Fascist  movements  that  increasingly  held  sway in Europe
(Italy,  Germany, Spain, Poland, Baltic republics,  the Balkans), and Asia (Japan).  Table 3
illustrates the increasing importance of economic blocs.
Table 3. Trade with 'economic blocs'  as percentage  of total country's trade
Economic bloc  Imports  Exports
1920  1938  1920  1938
United  Commonwealth,
Kingdom  colonies, protectorates  30  42  44  50
France  French colonies,
protectorates and  12  13  7  12
mandated territories
Netherlands  Dutch colonies  5.5  9  9  11
Italy  Italian colonies and
Ethiopia  0.5  2  2  23
Japan  Korea, Formosa,
Kwantung, Manchukuo  20  41  24  55
Germany  South-East Europe, Latin
America  16.5  28  13  24.5
Source:  League of Nations (1939, p.186).
Bairoch (1993) quoted in Baldwin and Martin  (1999,  p.14).
10Abandonment of  convertible currencies
Coupled with protectionism and regional blocs was, quite naturally, the end of the
Gold  Standard.  Table  4,  taken  from  a  League  of  Nations  documents,  charts  the
abandomnent of the Gold Standard and the introduction of capital controls with, in almost
all  cases,  multiple  exchange  rates.  As  the  Table  shows,  between  December  1929  and
April  1933,  thirty countries,  including  the two most important, the UK and the US, went
off the  Gold Standard.  Thus, the entire mechanism  of freely convertible  currencies  and
fixed exchange  rates that underpinned  massive  increase of trade and  capital  flows from
the mid-1850's to  1914, came to an end.
Table 4.  End of the Gold Standard and of convertible currencies
Official  Official  Official  Official
abandonment of  control of  abandonment of  control of
the gold  foreign  the gold  foreign
standard  exchange  standard  exchange
South Africa  Dec.  1932  January  1933  Greece  April  1932  Sept.  1931
Germany  July  1931  Hungary  July 1931
Argentina  Dec.  1929  October  1931  India  Sept.  1931
Australia  Dec.  1929  Ireland  Sept.  1931
Austria  April 1933  October  1931  Japan  Dec.  1931  July 1932
Bolivia  October  1931  October  1931  Latvia  Oct.  1931
Brazil  May  1931  Malaysia  Sept.  1931
Bulgaria  October  1931  Mexico  July 1931
Canada  October 1931  Nicaragua  Novem.  1931
Chile  April 1932  July  1932  Norway  Sept.  1931
Colombia  Sept.  1931  Sept.  1931  New Zealand  Jan.  1932
Costa Rica  January  1932  Palestine  Nov.  1931
Denmark  Sept.  1931  November  Paraguay  August 1932
1931
Egypt  Sept.  1931  Peru  May 1932
Ecuador  February  1932  April  1934  Iran  May 1932
Spain  May  1931  Portugal  Dec.  1932  Oct.  1922
Estonia  November  Romania  May 1932
1931
USA  March 1933  March  1933  UK  Sept.  1931
Finland  October  1931  El Salvador  Oct. 1931
Thailand  May 1932  Yugoslavia  October  1931
Sweden  September  1931  Turkey  February 1930
Czechoslovakia  September  Uruguay  Dec. 1929  Sept.  1931
1931  1  1
Source:  Statistical Yearbook of the League of Nations  1932/33, Geneva 1933, p.  265.
11Declining capital  and laborflows
As  trade  protectionism  and nationalism  were  on  the rise,  and  capital  controls
became  the  norm,  intemational  capital  flows  dried  out.  Before  World  War I,  most of
capital flows took the form  of purchases of railway and govermment bonds. According to
the  data  quoted  by Bordo,  Eichengreen  and  Irwin  (1999,  p.  30)  the  UK,  the  largest
creditor nation, held 40 percent of its overseas investments  in railway, and 30 percent  in
govemment bonds. The taste for both declined  as investors faced increased political  and
economic  hurdles  and  risks.12  The  devastation  of France  and Belgium,  and  weakened
financial  position  of the  Great  Britain,  combined  with  huge  reparations  imposed  on
Germany,  cut the potential  supply of funds  in the  largest capitalist  countries  (other than
the US). As Table 5 shows, foreign-held  assets as a share of world GDP halved. Average
(unweighted)  current account deficit (or surplus) as percentage  of GDP-the obverse side
of capital  transactions-decreased  from  about  4 percent  in the  1870-1914 period,  to  as
little as just over 1 percent in the 1930's (Baldwin and Martin,  1999, Figure 2, p. 9).
Table 5. Estimated foreign assets/world GDP (in percent)
11870  1900  1914  1930  l
6.9  18.6  17.5  8.4
Source: Crafts (2000, Table 2.3, p. 27). The original sources given there.
Labor  migration  which  according  to  Williamson  (1996)  and  O'Rourke  and
Williamson  (1999)  helped wage  convergence  within the Atlantic  economy'3 in the late
19*' century,  driving wages  up  in  the  out-migrant  countries  of Northern  and  Western
Europe,  and  wages  down  in  the  in-migrant  countries  (US,  Australia,  New  Zealand,
Canada)  all but  stopped  as  the policies  of the largest  recipient  country  became  much
more restrictive  in the  early  1920's.  The  US  immigration  rate  fell  by almost 2/3  (see
Table 6).
12 Direct foreign investments were, compared to portfolio investments, much less important before 1914
than they are today (Bordo, Eichengreen and Irwin,  1999, p. 35).
13 "Atlantic economy" is defined to include other countries of European settlement like Austrialia and New
Zealand.
12Similarly, large trans-Oceanic  or continental  migrations  (from India to the West
Indies  and  South-East Asia;  from  China to the United States  and  South Asia,  and from
Africa to North  and South America)  also diminished as  slavery and indentured  serfdom
were  abolished.  14  In keeping  with the  fact  that  the  inter-war  period  was  a "political"
period par  excellence,  many of the new migrants were political,  escaping first  from the
Bolshevik revolution,  then Hitler's tyranny  and Francoist revanchism.  America's  closed
doors,  and  European  countries'  unwillingness  to  absorb  political  refugees  from
neighboring  countries  led  to  the  burgeoning  of "stateless"  persons.  They  lived  in
countries of refuge unprotected,  and resented.  In words of the president of International
Red Cross, "it is impossible  that in the twentieth century, there could be 800,000 men in
Europe unprotected by any legal organisation recognized by international  law" (quoted in
Mazower,  2000, p.63).
Table 6. Immigration to the United  States
1870  1890  1910  1930
Imnigration rate  6.4  9.2  10.4  3.5
(per  1000
population)
Foreign bom as %  13.9  14.6  14.6  11.5
of population  I  I  I
Source: Crafts (2000, p. 30). The original source is  the US Bureau of the Census.
Conclusion
All  these  data-decline  in  capital  flows  and  migration,  stagnation  in  trade,
increased obstacles to free trade-show  a clear pattern of economic disintegration during
the period  between  the  two  World  Wars.  Trade  as  a  share  of GDP decreased,  as  did
capital  flows  and  the  importance  of foreign-held  assets.  Trade  barriers  increased  in all
major  countries,  and  in  some  of  them-which  strived  for  autarky-they  became
practically  impassable.  Bilateral  trade,  championed  by  Germany,  increased  all  around.
And,  of  course,  underlining  all  of this  was  the  fact  that  currencies  ceased  to  be
convertible,  and migration  virtually  stopped-except  for the trickle  driven by political
conflicts.
14 Between  1811 and  1870, about 2 million slaves from Africa were sent to the Americas (Bairoch,  1997,
vol.  2, p.  691).
133. What happened to income  convergence?
Using Maddison  's data
Such  a  violent process  of disintegration  of the world  economy  is, according  to
neoclassical  economic  theory,  expected  to  lead to a slowdown  in growth,  and-what is
important for our purposes-to  affect disproportionately  poorer  countries.  As the  world
economy disintegrates and trade and capital  and labor flows dry out, the poorer countries
would lose many advantages  associated with greater economic integration:  ability to use
foreign  technology,  to  receive  capital,  to  export  people and goods.  All but the  last are
supposed to be greater  for the poor members,  since  in a neoclassical  world they benefit
from  easy  application  of the  already  known  technology,  and  are  supposed  to  be
recipients of capital, and exporters of people.
Did then  incomes really diverge  during the inter-war  years?  We calculate  Gini,
Theil  and  coefficient  of variation  for unweighted  GDPs  per  capita  of twenty  major
Westem counties (the WENAO:  Westem Europe, North America and Oceania)'5 and also
for a  more  restricted  sample  of the countries  of the Atlantic  economy  (as  called  by
Lindert and Williamson).16 Gini and Theil are, of course, measures of inequality,  closely
related to the coefficient of variation (a) which is often used in convergence  discussions
(so  called  "sigma"  convergence).  We  prefer  Gini  or  Theil  because  they  are  better
established  measures  of  inequality  and  also  allow  us  to  move  easily  between
measurement  of inter-national,17 domestic,  and global inequality (the  latter  is inequality
among  all individuals in the world).  It was  the Gini coefficient  that was originally used
to measure convergence (Summers, Kravis and Heston,  1984) until it was overtaken by 1B
and  ca  convergence.  We calculate however  all  three measures  of inequality  as shown  in
'5  Australia, Austria,  Belgium,  Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,  Italy,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,  Switzerland, United Kingdom and the US.
16 That is, the same WENAO countries from the previous  footnote minus Greece, Portugal and Spain. This
is the group called "Western Europe and its offshoots" by Maddison (2001).
17 Inter-national inequality comes  in two "fonns": Concept  I  inequality which we calculate here where each
country's GDP per capita is assigned the same weight, or Concept 2 inequality, where each GDP per capita
is weighted by country's population (see Milanovic,  2002a).
14Figures 2  and 3. The data on GDP per capita (expressed in  1990 Geary-Khamis  dollars)
are taken from Maddison (2001).
Figure 2 shows that using either Gini, Theil or the coefficient of variation, we find
that WENAO  incomes (GDPs per capita)  did not diverge during the inter-war period.  If
anything,  there  was  a  mild  convergence.  In  1919,  the  Gini,  Theil  and  coefficient  of
variation were respectively  19, 0.06 and 0.34;  in 1939, they were  15, 0.04 and 0.27.  18  It
is the Second  World War which  wrought a massive disruption of economic  activity in a
number of continental European  countries (between  1939 and 1945,  Germany's  GDP per
capita  decreased by 23  percent,  France's  by almost 50  percent,  Greece's  by two-thirds
etc.). On the other hand, the US, Canada, and Australia surged ahead  (by respectively 78,
50  and  18  percent),  thus  widening  differences  in  GDPs per  capita  and "creating"  the
divergence.  The  Gini went up from  15 just  before the  outbreak  of the War to  31  at its
end;  the coefficient of variation  from 0.27 to 0.58.  Of course,  income  divergence is not
unique  to the  Second World  War.  The same divergence  in incomes,  albeit of a smaller
size, occurred during the First World War (see Figures 2  and 3).
1  The Gini coefficient is expressed in percents.
15Figure 2. Gini, Theil, coefficient of variation  of GDP per capita (WENAO  countries,  1820-950)
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Figure 3. Gini, Theil, coefficient of variation of GDP per capita (Atlantic economy,  1820-1950)
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16But  much  more  dramatic  and  telling  is  the  example  of the  Atlantic  economy.
Figure 3 shows that the inter-war period witnessed  thefastest income  convergence  ever
recorded up to then. The negative slope of the Gini, Theil and coefficient of variation line
is much steeper than during the heyday of the first globalization.  The  Gini coefficient in
1918 was 20; on the eve of the Second World War, it has almost halved:  it was only 11.
The coefficient of variation decreased from 0.38  in 1918 to 0.2 twenty years later. This is
all the more interesting since it is with respect to this group that Lindert and Williamson
claim that disintegration  of world  economy led to  income  divergence.  As can be easily
checked,  their  mistake  stems  from  a  comparison  of 1913  and  1945.  Indeed,  income
differences  in  1945  were  greater  than  in  1913,  but  that  was  entirely  due  to  the  huge
difference  in fortune  during  the Second World  War. Ascribing  the increase  in between-
country inequality to the developments during the inter-war period is entirely wrong. The
Gini  coefficient of GDPs per capita of  the Atlantic  economy countries  declined  almost
uninterruptedly between  1919 and  1939. Their incomes have never after 1870 been more
similar than on the eve of the Second World War.
As  Table 7  illustrates,  income differences  between  the  countries  of the  Atlantic
economy in  1939  were about the  same as  in  1973.  It is only during the last  thirty years
that the differences  between these countries have shrunk  below the level that obtained in
1939. The Gini coefficient of GDPs per capita was (as already mentioned)  only 11 on the
eve of the Second World War,  11.2 on the eve of the first oil crisis, and 6.4 today.  19So,  if
we look at how wide  was  the dispersal  of the  Atlantic  economies'  incomes  in the  past
compared to today, it is only with greatest difficulty that we can discern some difference
until  rather recently.  And  note  that we are comparing  the  two  situations  (in  1939  and
1973) where trade and capital flows  and even more so, trade ratios were vastly different.
Incomes dispersion in a heavily integrated and a heavily disintegrated economy  are thus
shown to be fairly similar.
19 In 1939, income ratio between the richest and poorest country was about 2 to  1.  It widened to about 3 to
1 in 1973,  and then shrunk to less than 2 to 1 today.
17Table 7. Incomes in the Atlantic economy in 1939,  1973 and 1999
GDP per  Relative  GDP per  Relative  GDP per  Relative
capita  in  GDP per  capita in  GDP per  capita in  GDP per
1939  capita  1973  capita  1999  capita
(1990 PPP  (richest  (1990 PPP  (richest  (1995 PPP  (richest
dollars)  country-l)  dollars)  country=i)  dollars)  country=1)
USA  6568  1.00  20106  0.89  30610  1.00
New Zealand  6492  0.99  13653  0.60  16660  0.54
Switzerland  6273  0.96  22674  1.00  26760  0.87
UK  5979  0.91  13469  0.59  20983  0.69
Denmark  5766  0.88  14688  0.65  23252  0.76
Australia  5631  0.86  13343  0.59  21173  0.69
Germany  5549  0.84  15199  0.67  21340  0.70
Netherlands  5409  0.82  14085  0.62  22469  0.73
Belgium  5040  0.77  14778  0.65  23668  0.77
Sweden  5029  0.77  14248  0.63  20339  0.66
France  4748  0.72  14671  0.65  22848  0.75
Canada  4518  0.69  15461  0.68  23162  0.76
Austria  4123  0.63  13414  0.59  23229  0.76
Norway  4108  0.63  11459  0.51  24074  0.79
Italy  3444  0.52  12360  0.55  20720  0.68
Finland  3310  0.50  12290  0.54  20985  0.69
Ireland  1/  3116  0.47  7036  0.31  22271  0.73
Gini  11.0  11.2  6.4
Theil  0.019  0.025  0.008
Richest-
poorest ratio  2.1  3.2  1.9
Sources: Data for  1939 from Maddison (1995).  Data for 1999 from World Bank SIMA  database. Countries
ranked by GDP per capita in 1939. The approximate conversion between  1995 and 1990 PPP dollars is 1.16
to 1. "Atlantic" economy includes New Zealand and Australia.
1/ Data for 1938.
We  can  test  for  convergence  also  using  more  standard  regressions  test.  As  is
conventionally  done, we regress growth rate of GDP per capita (change  in income logs)
on initial level of income (yi, t-1)  where i indicates country subscript, and t time, 20
20 This formulation is rife with problems. Other than the most obvious  econpometric problems of omitted
variable and endogeneity (which we also address below), formulation such as (1) suffers from Galton's
fallacy  (see  Quah,  1993, Bliss  1999), weakness of empirical tests used to test for the  3 convergence so that
beta convergence can be observed both when one moves forward  and backward in time and can exist
whether the underlying distribution diverges, converges  or stays the same (see Wodon and Yitzhaki, 2002),
and  even interpreatation  of the obtained results (Quah,  1996). We use it because  it is the simplest and the
most commonly used formulation in the (immense)  literature on convergence.  As explained above, our
view is  that direct tests of unconditional  convergence (as implied in the calculation  of the Gini
coefficients)  are far superior to the regression analysis.
18(1)  lnya -lny,,t  -i  =lo+,llnyz,,t-I+ 2hnZe+ui+v:+eet
and  hn  Zit  =  In  (n,t+g+6)  where  n1t=  population  growth  rate,  g=rate  of labor
augmenting technological progress  and 6=depreciation  rate (all derived from the textbook
Solow model of economic  growth), and ui,  vt, and e,t, country- time- and both-dependent
error term.  All GDP per capita values  are taken  at 5 year intervals,  and thus the  growth
rate (the dependent variable) is the average growth rate over a five year period.
Equations  such as (1) potentially suffer from a number of econometric  problems.
The  most  obvious  are  the  omitted  variable  bias  where  relevant  country-specific
information  is  not  included,  21  and  endogeneity  where  the  dependent  and independent
variables  are jointly  determined.  We thus  run three formulations  of (1).  The results  are
shown  in  Table  8.  In  the  first  formulation,  we  simply run  a  pooled  regression  using
indiscriminately  cross-section  and time-series  data.  For the pre-1914  period, we see  no
evidence of convergence;  for the inter-war period, we obtain a statistically significant and
negative  coefficient  on initial  income.  In  the  second  formulation,  we  address  potential
endogeneity  by instrumenting  the  right-hand  side variables  by their  lagged  values.  No
variable  is  still  significant  for  the  pre-1914  period;  for  the  inter-war  period,  the
coefficient on the initial income declines (as we would expect) and becomes significant at
1 percent level. Finally, in the third formulation,  we adjust for country-specific  effects by
estimating  a  fixed-effects  model.  The results  are  again the  same:  the  pre-1914 period
exhibits no convergence,  the inter-war period does, and a very strong one.
21  Since our model is  by necessity (since other relevant variables  like investment rate, education levels etc.
are unavailable)  very stripped-down,  there are strong grounds to believe that relevant country-specific
features are ornitted.
19Table 8. Convergence in the two periods  (1870-1913 and 1918-1938)
(dependent variable:  annualized GDP per capita growth over the five-year interval)
Pooled regression  IV regression  Fixed effects
1870-1913  1918-1938  1870-1913  1919-1938  1870-1913  1919-1938
In y,  -0.001  -0.018*  -0.016  -0.013**  -0.0009  -0.057*
(0.78)  (0.02)  (0.68)  (0.01)  (0.91)  (0.02)
ln(n+8+X)  -0.008  0.025  -0.002  0.024  -0.011  0.073
(0.32)  (0.38)  (0.89)  (0.12)  (0.46)  (0.12)
Constant  -0.0007  0.235*  0.02  0.19  -0.01  0.69**
(0.99)  (0.02)  (0.70)  (0.10)  (0.88)  (0.008)
No. of  127  90  109  69  127  90
observations
R2  0.01  0.05  0.00  0.13  0.01  0.07
Note: For most of the pre- 1900 years,  the annualized growth rate is calculated over a ten-year interval smce
GDP per capita data are available  at such intervals  only. Growth rate of population is calculated in exactly
the same fashion, and over the same period,  as that of GDP per capita.
In  conclusion, the standard  convergence  regressions confirm  that the evidence  of
convergence  is stronger during the inter-war period, while it is entirely absent for the pre-
1914 period.
Using Bairoch and Prados  de la Escosura  's data
In  addition  to Maddison's  data which  are the most complete,  we  have two other
GDP per capita  series that cover the period  1870-1939.  They are Bairoch's  (1997)  data,
and those produced by Prados de la Escosura (2000).22 Figures 4 and 5 show the Gini and
Theil coefficients  using these alternative sources, and covering the same set of countries.
For  the  period  1870-1938,  the  country  coverage  in  the  three  databases  (Maddison,
Bairoch and  Prados  de la Escosura)  is practically the  same (see Annex).  For the period
before  1870, Prados  de la Escosura's coverage is more limited (13 or 15  countries vs.  19
for Bairoch and Maddison).
Bairoch  and Prados  de  la  Escosura  data  are  available  only  for  selected  years.
Using Bairoch's  series, we find that both Gini and Theil indexes  are stable between  1890
22 Bairoch's GDPs per capita are given in 1960 mternational  dollars. Prados de la Escosura's are expressed
in current dollars of equal purchasing power panty, so that between-country comparisons  for a given year
are possible, but not comparisons between the years. The data base is scaled (for each year) in such a way
that the US GDP per capita is equal to  1.
20and  1929,  and then display a very strong income  convergence  between  1929  and  1939.
Using Prados  de la Escosura's  data, there is a convergence  between  1860 and  1913, and
then divergence during the inter-war  years.23
As  a  glance  at  Figures  2-5  reveals,  original  income  divergence,  according  to
Bairoch,  is much  sharper and  seems  to  have  lasted  longer  than the  one obtained  from
Maddison's  data.  According  to  Bairoch,  divergence  starts  around  1800  and  goes  on,
almost without  interruption,  until  1890.  After that,  inequality is  stable  until  the  Great
Depression,  and  only  during  the  last  decade  before  the  World  War  II,  there  is
convergence.  If we  look at  Maddison's  data,  however,  the  divergence  begins  in  1820
(when his series originate)  and reaches  its peak around  1880. After that, there is at first a
slow,  and  then  a faster  convergence  until the First World War.  The  inter-war period  is
characterized by a mild convergence.  24
Table 9 summarizes the findings regarding convergence and divergence using the
data from the three authors.
23 Prados de la Escosura data are obtained by the so-called "short-cut" method, that is from a regression
between the price level (purchasing power exchange rate over market exchange rate) on the LHS, and GDP
per capita at current exchange rate and several other controls (openness, current account balance) on the
RHS. The regression is run, of course, only for the countries  for which the data are available. The estimated
parameters  from such an equation together with values for each independent variable are then used to
predict the price level (that is, PPP) for the missing years and countries (see Prados de la Escosura, 2000,
pp. 8-1 1). The fact that Prados de la Escosura data show income divergence while both Bairoch and
Maddison show income convergence may be explained by the use of current PPPs by Prados de la
Escosura. The implication is that prices of non-tradables have increased more in rich than in poor countries.
24 The increase  in inequality  following the Industrial Revolution is much greater if one uses Bairoch's
rather than Maddison's data. According to Maddison,  the Gini in 1820 was  12 (see Figure  1). According  to
Bairoch, it was (for the same set of countries) only 6 in 1800 and 9 in 1830. This is due to the fact that
Bairoch's  data show poor WENAO countries with (relatively) higher GDPs per capita than Maddison's.
For example, in 1820, the ratio between the richest and poorest WENAO country (UK and Finland)  is 2.3
to 1 in Maddison's data,  but in Bairoch's, it is only 1.9  to 1 in 1830 and 1.3  to 1 in 1800  (in both cases,
UK vs. Finland). In general, Bairoch's estimates of (relative) income per capita of the future less developed
countries at the time of the Industrial Revolution are generally higher than Maddison's.
21Table 9. Income convergence  and divergence according to different authors
Beginning of the 19th  1870 to 1913  Between the two wars
century to 1870  (Heyday of
(Modern era)  globalization)  (Deglobalization)
Maddison  Strong divergence  Convergence  Mild convergence
(strong convergence
for Atlantic economy)
Bairoch  Very strong  Divergence and  Convergence
divergence  then stability after
1890
Prados de la  No data  Convergence  Divergence
Escosura
22Figure 4. Gini coefficients,  1800-1938
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23Growth rates
Finally, we may ask whether the inter-war period was unique by having had very
low  growth  rates,  as  it  is sometimes  believed.  Table  10  gives the  population-weighted
average  growth rate of GDP per capita  (using Maddison's  data)  for WENAO  countries.
The end point of the first period is the peak before the crisis of 1890; the end point of the
third  period  is  the  peak  before  the  Great  Depression.  For the  other  two  periods,  the
"natural"  end-points  are,  of  course,  the  two  Wars.  We  see  that  the  1929-39  period
displays a somewhat  lower growth rate than the 40+ years of the first globalization.  The
differences  however  are  not enormous.  After a  generation  (twenty  years)  of growth at
0.61 percent per annum,  a person's real income would be some 13  percent higher than in
the beginning;  if the  growth rate were  0.45  percent  per annum,  his income would be  9
percent higher.
Table 10. Average population-weighted  growth rates of the WENAO region
(per capita, per annum)
1870-1890  1890-1913  1919-1929  1929-1939
Growth rate  0.58  0.67  0.98  0.45
Note: growth rates calculated  using a log-regression.  These are average growth rates taling into
account the entire population of WENAO.
Source: Calculated from Maddison (2001).
Table 11. Average  unweighted GDP growth rates of the WENAO region
(annualized  five-year averages)
1870-1890  1890-1913  1919-1929  1929-1939
Growth rates  1.21  1.43  1.52  1.55
Observations  62  65  34  56
Average growth  1.4  1.5
(stand.  (1.3)  (2.9)
deviation)  I_I
Source:  calculated  from Maddison ( 2001).
The differences between  the periods are even less if we look at countries'  growth
rates  abstracting  from  the  population  size  (see  Table  11).  Both  the  median  and  mean
(annualized  five-year)  growth  rates  were  almost  the  same  in  the  pre-  and  post-1914
24periods.  It is only because of the Great Depression  and due to the after-war rebound  that
the inter-war growth rates were more dispersed (see Figure 6).
Figure 6. Distribution of countries'  growth rates
(annualized five-year averages)
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Source: Calculated from Maddison ( 2001).
Finally, one may wonder to  what an extent income convergence  in the inter-war
period was due to  Italy and Germany,  the two major Fascist powers whose growth was
fairly fast during a part of the inter-war period.  Both Italy and Germany were less rich in
1919 than the  median  WENAO  country.  25  Italy's growth rate  between  1922  and  1940
was only  slightly  higher than the unweighted  WENAO  average:  1.1  percent per person
per  annum  vs.  the  mean of 0.93.  Germany's  rate  between  1933  and  1940  was  indeed
much higher than  the mean WENAO rate: 7.2 percent vs.  2.7.26  But if we drop Germany
from the sample, there is practically no change in the Gini or Theil index.
25  Italy's rank was 1  Ih,  Germany's  12'  out of 17 WENAO countries.
26 Part of it was certainly due to the catch-up effect following upon an extremely  high decline in GDP
during the Great Depression.  That catch-up element would have been here with or without the Nazis.
254. The implications
We  can  now  see  that the  statement  in  Lindert  and  Williamson  (2001)  that  the
disintegration  of world economy generated  income divergence  is quite misleading.  After
comparing inequality in incomes on the eve of World War I and at the end of World War
11-which in itself is a rather dubious way of making a comparison akin to comparing the
peak  to  a  trough  of a business  cycle-and  finding  that  inequality  in  1945  was much
greater,  they  "assigned"  the  increasing  income  gap  miscellaneously  to  "the  great
depression,  two world  wars,  anti-global  policies and other forces".  Now we can readily
see that all of the increased  gap was due to the effects  of the World War II, and none to
"anti-global  policies."  Despite  "anti-global"  policies,  income  gap  continued  to  shrink
between  1919 and 1939.
If both  (i)  greater  integration  of world  economy,  and  more  specifically  closer
links between the advanced capitalist economies  (both before World War I and during the
last 50  years),  and (ii) disintegration of world economy, produce about the same  effects
on  relative  income  gaps  between  the  countries,  then  the  trade-induced  theory  of
convergence  cannot  be  right.  Our  empirical  findings  would  seem  to  suggest  that
convergence  is  a  phenomenon  independent  of economic  integration.  In  other  words,
greater trade, migration, or capital  flows, have no discemable  effect on the  catch-up  of
the  poorer  countries.  In  effect,  poorer  countries  catch  up  within  the  subset  of rich
(WENAO)  countries,  all  the  same  whether  there  is  economic  integration  or not.  This
could then, in turn, suggest several possibilities.
The  first  possibility  is  that  endogenous  or  neoclassical  models  that  display
increasing  returns  to  scale  may  explain  what  we  have  observed  during  the  inter-war
years.  If there are  increasing  returns to capital  or labor,  then for the poorer countries to
cut off the  links with the rest of the world,  is a way to catch  up.  But this  is doubtful  as
after  World  War II,  the  period  of rising  integration  was  also  accompanied  by income
convergence.
26A different  explanation  is  as  follows.  Consider  Figure  7 which  shows  the  Gini
coefficient  of per capita  incomes of WENAO  countries  for all years between  1870 and
1998. Over this long period of almost 130 years, income differences  among the set of rich
countries are either constant or decreasing during all peacetime periods. Only during wars
do their incomes  diverge. And it is only by the mid-1970's  (there is a  slight difference
depending on whether we measure it using the Gini  or Theil)  that the level of similarity
between their incomes had reached  the values achieved before the Second World War or
even before the First. The underlying policies-integration  or disintegration,  openness or
autarky-changed  during  this  long period  of 130  years but  did  not  seem  to  have  had
much of an effect on convergence of countries'  incomes. If whether countries trade more
or less, or invest more or less into each other's  economies,  does not seem to  matter for
convergence  of their incomes-or in other words, does not affect the growth rate of poor
economies  vis-a-vis  rich economies-then  what  other  factors  might  explain  such  an
outcome?  We propose the following hypothesis.
27Figure 7. Inequality among  WENAO countries,  1820-1998
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Note: After  1950, Israel  and Turkey are added to the WENAO  group.
Since  we  deal  here  with  a  subgroup  of rich  Western  economies  that  are  well
integrated,  in a cultural sense, so that technological  transfers (via books, private exchange
of information,  personal  and  business travel  etc.) do take place almost as much whether
there  is  a lot of trade  and  direct  foreign  investment  or not,  then  convergence  may be
simply  a reflection  of that deeper  integration.  Transmission  of information  is what  may
drive modernization  of the techniques of production, total factor productivity  growth and
ultimately income convergence  (as implied  by endogenous  growth literature;  see Jones,
1997,  p.  25  or  Easterly  and  Levine,  2001,  p.  185).  It  is not  irrelevant  to  this  line  of
thought that even during the era of the  1930's, Italy's  industrialization, for example, was
decisively  influenced by the American  example.  Giovanni  Agnelli,  FIAT's owner,  after
a visit to  Ford,  copied  Ford's  techniques  of production.  Olivetti,  the  office-equipment
maker,  and  Pirelli,  the  tire  company,  were  set  on  the  path  of  becoming  large
multinationals  in these years-again  applying American  techniques  of mass  production
(i.e. what was later termed "Fordism").
28In  conclusion,  for  economies  similar  in  terms  of their  incomes,  structure  and
cultural  proximity,  trade  and  direct  investments  may not matter  as  much  (or  at  all).
Within their "club", the poorer economies'  growth rate relative to growth rate of the rich,
may  not be  affected  by  greater  or lesser  integration.  Whether  for dissimilar  countries,
where  the  links  between the  economies  and  populations  are  few,  the  same is true,  or
whether in that case,  economic  integration needs to be "embodied" in goods  and capital
in order for the catch-up to take place, remains an open question.
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